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The sense of agency is the experience of controlling both one’s body and the external
environment. Although the sense of agency has been studied extensively, there is a
paucity of studies in applied “real-life” situations. One applied domain that seems highly
relevant is human-computer-interaction (HCI), as an increasing number of our everyday
agentive interactions involve technology. Indeed, HCI has long recognized the feeling of
control as a key factor in how people experience interactions with technology. The aim of
this review is to summarize and examine the possible links between sense of agency and
understanding control in HCI. We explore the overlap between HCI and sense of agency
for computer input modalities and system feedback, computer assistance, and joint actions
between humans and computers. An overarching consideration is how agency research
can inform HCI and vice versa. Finally, we discuss the potential ethical implications of
personal responsibility in an ever-increasing society of technology users and intelligent
machine interfaces.
Keywords: sense of agency, human computer interaction, control, technology, computer assistance, joint action
INTRODUCTION
The sense of agency is the experience of controlling both one’s
body and the external environment. This experience has received
a considerable amount of attention in the field of cognitive
neuroscience, due in part to the recognition that a disordered
sense of agency is central to illnesses such as schizophrenia
(Frith, 1992). The sense of agency is also an important part
of human consciousness more generally, forming a fundamen-
tal aspect of self-awareness (Gallagher, 2002). In this review,
we will primarily focus on the sense of agency for control
over the external environment. This is because it is most
pertinent to the human-computer-interaction (HCI) issues we
consider.
The sense of agency is a vital consideration for assessing how
people experience interactions with technology, a core focus for
research in the field of HCI. The seventh of Shneiderman’s Rules
of Interface Design states that designers should strive to create
computer interfaces that “support an internal locus of control”
(Shneiderman and Plaisant, 2004). This is based on the obser-
vation that users “strongly desire the sense that they are in charge
of the system and that the system responds to their actions”. What
makes our understanding of agency in HCI especially pertinent
is the fact that an increasing number of our everyday agentive
interactions involve technology. During interactions with tech-
nology, the simple process of producing an action to cause an
intended outcome is endowed with a whole host of possible
variables that can alter the agentive experience dramatically. Thus
both cognitive neuroscience and HCI seek to understand how
humans experience agency and control over action execution. The
aim of this review is to examine the links between sense of agency
in cognitive neuroscience and HCI and highlight some possible
new research directions.
We pose that an interdisciplinary combination of HCI research
and cognitive neuroscience to investigate the sense of agency
can provide a rich and promising new research area that has
the potential to inform both fields in novel ways. Research into
the sense of agency stands to benefit from the new interaction
techniques rapidly being developed in the field of HCI such as
gestural input, physiological or intelligent interfaces and assis-
tance methods. Thus enabling novel ways of producing actions
to be incorporated into such research. Moreover, testing agency
in more “real-world” settings can lead to new insights regarding
the nature and parameters of agentive experiences in everyday
interactions. Equally, HCI research can take advantage of the
relative maturity of neurocognitive research and the reliable
metrics for the experience of volitional control that have been
developed. An incorporation of such metrics will encourage the
HCI researcher to consider the sense of agency as a quantifi-
able experience in future research. Furthermore, understanding
the neurocognitive processes and mechanisms that support this
experience provides an important evidence base and guide for
interface design. The first section of this paper briefly considers
the theoretical and methodological background of research on the
sense of agency. We then discuss the potential implications and
areas of overlap of these theories and methods for three specific
areas of HCI research: (1) input modalities and system feedback;
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(2) computer assistance; and (3) collaboration and attribution of
agency.
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND INTO
THE SENSE OF AGENCY
As stated above, the sense of agency is the experience of con-
trolling both one’s body and the external environment. On this
definition, control is central to the experience of being an agent. In
the psychological literature a number of studies have investigated
the relationship between control and agency. For example, it has
been shown that sense of agency is altered by a manipulation
of the statistical relationship between actions and effects (Moore
et al., 2009) and by a manipulation of the perception of control
over action (Desantis et al., 2011). More recent work by Kumar
and Srinivasan (2014) has also looked at how sense of agency
is influenced by control specified at different hierarchical levels.
This work shows, in part, that when higher-level control is exer-
cised (i.e., goal-level control) lower level control processes (i.e.,
perceptuo-motor control) have no influence on sense of agency.
This relationship between control and sense of agency is highly
relevant in the context of HCI, given the fact that different HCI
applications involve different kinds of control manipulations.
A phenomenological distinction has been made between the
“Feeling of Agency” and the “Judgement of Agency” (Synofzik
et al., 2008). The feeling of agency refers to the implicit, pre-
reflective, low-level feeling of being the agent of an action.
The judgement of agency describes the explicit judgement and
attribution of agency to oneself or another on a conceptual
level. Traditionally there are two theoretical views regarding the
neurocognitive processes underlying the sense of agency. Some
have suggested that the sense of agency arises principally from
internal processes serving motor control (Blakemore et al., 2002;
Haggard, 2005). On the other hand, external situational cues
have been emphasized (Wegner, 2002, 2003). However, it is now
becoming increasingly recognized that this is a false dichotomy
and that various cues contribute to the sense of agency (Wegner
and Sparrow, 2004; Wegner et al., 2004; Moore et al., 2009; Moore
and Fletcher, 2012; Kranick and Hallett, 2013). These cues include
internal sensorimotor signals and external situational informa-
tion (Moore and Fletcher, 2012). Moreover, it has been suggested
that the influence of these cues depends on their reliability
(Moore and Fletcher, 2012), implying some form of optimal cue
integration. According to the cue integration concept, multiple
agency cues are weighted by their relative reliability and then opti-
mally integrated to reduce the variability of the estimated origins
of an action.
Researchers have developed numerous ways of measuring the
components of the sense of agency experimentally. The explicit
judgement of agency is typically measured by verbal report by
asking participants to rate their feeling of agency during a task
or simply state whether they were the agent or not. Measures have
also been developed to probe implicit aspects of sense of agency.
These include sensory attenuation paradigms (e.g., Blakemore
et al., 1998) and intentional binding (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002).
In this review we focus primarily on intentional binding. In this
paradigm participants report the perceived time of voluntary
action initiation and the consequent effects using the so-called
Libet clock. Haggard et al. (2002) found that when participants
caused an action, their perceived time of initiation and the per-
ceived time of the outcome where brought closer together, i.e., the
perceived interval between voluntary actions and outcomes was
shorter than the actual interval (Figure 1). In the case of invol-
untary actions the perceived interval was found to be longer than
the actual interval. This phenomenon is known as “intentional
binding”, and is seen as an implicit metric for the sense agency.
Intentional binding is a widely used implicit measure of
the sense agency and the effect has been replicated widely and
in a number of settings (e.g., see Wohlschläger et al., 2003;
Engbert and Wohlschläger, 2007; Moore et al., 2009; Aarts
and van den Bos, 2011). More recently, alternative intentional
binding measures have been developed, such as the direct
interval estimation procedure where the participant is required
to estimate the interval between actions and outcomes (e.g., see
Moore et al., 2009; Humphreys and Buehner, 2009; Coyle et al.,
2012). As stated above, intentional binding is the predominant
measure considered in this review. The main reason for this is
that while it seems particularly well suited to the nature of agent
interaction during many interactions with technology, it has not
yet been widely applied in the HCI domain. One key advantage
of intentional binding in the context of HCI is that it is typically
measured at sub-second sensorimotor timescales, which are
common in HCI. An additional benefit of intentional binding in
the context of HCI is that it offers a measure of the degree of sense
of agency the individual experiences, rather than being a binary
“me” vs. “not me” measure. However, it is important to note that
intentional binding may not be best suited for assessing sense of
agency for all types of tasks within HCI, such as those agentive
interactions operating at much longer timescales (although see
Faro et al., 2013, for review of literature suggesting that binding
may operate at longer timescales).
FIGURE 1 | Intentional Binding. (A) During voluntary action, the perceived
time of action and outcome are shifted toward one another, resulting in a
shorter perceived interval between action and outcome. (B) During
involuntary actions, the perceived time interval between action and
outcome is longer than the actual delay.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 643 | 2
Limerick et al. The experience of agency in HCI
INPUT MODALITIES AND SYSTEM FEEDBACK
The first point of contact between the sense of agency and HCI
we wish to consider is the importance of input modalities. Input
modalities are the sensors or devices by which the computer
receives input from the human, e.g., a keyboard or mouse. The
input modality is central to the process of producing actions
in order to bring about the user’s desired state changes in the
computer and thus also central to the sense of agency over
the action. HCI research is interested in how to optimally turn
psychological states (such as intentions) into state changes within
the computer. The user’s intentions and the system’s state differ
considerably in form and content and one of the challenges of
HCI is to bridge this gap. This separation is known as the Gulf
of Execution (Norman, 1986). The input modality of the system
is central to bridging the Gulf of Execution. Norman (1986)
states:
“Execution of an action means to do something, whether it is just
to say something or perform a complex motor sequence. Just what
physical actions are required is determined by the choice of input
devices on the system, and this can make a major difference in
the usability of the system. Because some physical actions are more
difficult than others, the choice of input devices can affect the selection
of actions which in turn affects how well the system matches with
intentions”.
More recently a similar message has been emphasized by
Williamson et al. (2009) who state:
“A computer interface facilitates control. It provides a set of mech-
anisms by which a human can drive the belief of a system about a
user’s intentions towards a desired state over a period of time. Control
requires both display to the user and input from the user; computers
feedback state to a user, who modifies his or her actions to bring about
the required change of state”.
In recent years HCI researchers have developed a wide range
of new interaction techniques and devices such as speech and
gestural control. These are rapidly becoming common place,
with everyday devices having the option of being controlled by
such interaction including, smart phones (Apple’s Siri), tele-
visions (Samsung’s Smart TV), computers (Leap Motion) and
games consoles (Microsoft Kinect). Each new method of con-
trolling technology presents new challenges to HCI researchers.
New input modalities offer different ways of “bridging the Gulf
of Execution” including distinct action initiation requirements,
feedback mechanisms, and device capabilities (Figure 2). This has
the potential to dramatically reshape the experience of control
and agency. In this section we consider some of the ways in which
agency research can help to inform such issues. From a cognitive
neuroscience perspective different modes of action execution pose
interesting questions. Experimental investigations into the sense
of agency have typically involved participants controlling their
environment via conventional input devices such as a keyboard
or mouse. Altering the sensorimotor requirements for action
execution presents an opportunity to further investigate the sense
of agency during distinctly new sensorimotor requirements.
INPUT MODALITIES
To begin addressing the impact of input modalities on the sense
of agency, Coyle et al. (2012) conducted an experiment employing
intentional binding as an implicit measure of users’ sense of
agency for two distinctive input techniques. In one condition
participants pressed a button on a keyboard to cause an outcome
(a beep). In the second condition participants wore a skin-based
input device and tapped their arm to cause a beep (Figure 3).
Results show that intentional binding was significantly greater
for skin-based input than the keyboard input, thus indicating a
stronger sense of agency with skin-based input. From an input
design perspective this is interesting as it indicates that skin-based
input is experienced as significantly more responsive than button-
based input. More broadly, Coyle et al. provided evidence that
different interaction techniques can provide different experiences
of agency to those offered by traditional mouse or keyboard
interactions. It also demonstrated the potential of intentional
binding to quantify this difference. In future this method can be
used to assess and quantify the differences for a larger range of
interaction techniques, including changes more subtle than those
assessed here. We could for example assess the difference in the
experience of agency during interactions with a touch screen via a
stylus vs. direct finger interaction, or differences in interactions
that incorporate techniques such as haptic, embodied or phys-
iological input. We can also compare the different interaction
experiences for a specific input technique when other conditions
of the interactions change, e.g., when conditions such as system
feedback, reliability or latency are varied. Greater consideration is
given to these possibilities below.
The finding that skin-based input results in greater intentional
binding also raises interesting questions regarding the underlying
cognitive processes for the sense of agency. One possible explana-
tion for the higher sense of implicit agency measured in the skin-
based input is that, with a self directed, skin-based action, there is
a higher degree of congruence between the internally predicted
sensory output of the action and the actual sensory output of
the action. Intentional binding may be strengthened when the
individual is more sensorially aware of their action. Another
possible explanation in line with the cue integration theory for
agency is that for the skin-input conditions, participants receive
additional sensory agency cues from the passive limb, which is
acting as the input modality. This may serve to increase sense of
agency. A final possible explanation is linked to the finding that
actions aimed at the self are associated with increased activity
within the motor system (Master and Tremblay, 2010). Given
that the sense of agency is closely tied to sensorimotor processes,
increased activity within this system might increase the sense of
agency. These are all possibilities that we are currently exploring.
Whatever the explanation, this study shows how the new modes
of interaction being developed in HCI can open up new avenues
of enquiry for the neurocognitive understanding of the sense of
agency.
RELIABILITY
Coyle et al. (2012) represents an early application of intentional
binding to explicitly address an HCI research question. But there
are many more specific input design questions and trade offs that
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FIGURE 2 | A closed loop input system, based on Norman (1986) and Williamson et al. (2009).
FIGURE 3 | In Coyle et al. (2012) a piezo-electric contact microphone
was placed on the user’s arm and connected to a computer. Vibrations
on the user’s arm were monitored to detect when the user tapped on their
arm.
can be informed by their approach. System reliability is one such
issue.
Many input techniques suffer from varying degrees of reliabil-
ity, due to the fact that the interaction requires the computer’s sen-
sors to recognize and then classify the intention of the user, which
is not always clear-cut and often noisy. Consider for example a
speech interface and the various possible accents the user may
have. A speech system designed to accommodate many different
accents is likely to result in more incorrect classifications of
peoples’ utterances. Speech systems could be made more reliable
through initial training periods or by allowing the system more
time to classify utterances. But this reduces the responsiveness of
the speech input system. In a similar vein a gesture recognition
system like the Microsoft Kinect is required to recognize a wide
range of mid-air gestures. Even for simple gestures there are
variations in the way different people will execute the gesture. A
system that allows leeway for variations in action execution will be
more flexible, but again may result in more misclassifications of
peoples’ actions. Designers of such systems are therefore required
to make trade-offs between constraints such as accuracy and
flexibility, both of which affect system reliability.
Reliability is analogous to the predictability of an action and
has been found in neurocognitive research to affect sense of
agency. Empirical evidence suggests that participants experience
a lower sense of agency for unexpected outcomes of their actions
(Sato and Yasuda, 2005). Moore and Haggard (2008) investigated
inference and prediction for conditions where there was either
a high or low probability of an outcome. The results indicated
that in both probability conditions, participants exhibited binding
for situations where the action was followed by the outcome.
For high probability conditions, participants also exhibited inten-
tional binding for trials where the action was not followed by
an outcome, suggesting that a strong prediction was sufficient to
generate the binding effect. With regard to input modalities and
reliability, these results suggest that the more reliable an input
method is, both in terms of matching the intended outcome and
in predictability, the greater the sense of agency experienced by the
user. In future similar approaches may provide HCI researchers
with a concrete means of investigating how reliable a system needs
to be before people begin to experience significant reductions in
their sense of agency. Evidence from such studies will help design-
ers to make more informed decisions regarding the reliability
trade-offs in new input systems.
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SYSTEM FEEDBACK
In addition to the input modality, control over a computer system
requires feedback to inform the user of the system’s current state,
the actions required to bring about changes in the system’s state
in line with their intentions and the success of those actions.
The user can then use this feedback to modify their consequent
actions to bring about the next desired outcome. In HCI, the
mode of feedback and the information the interface provides
regarding the system’s state is again an important consideration.
Parallel to the Gulf of Execution, Norman describes the Gulf
of Evaluation (Norman, 1988), which refers to the mismatch
between the system’s feedback regarding it’s actual state and how
this state is perceived by the user in terms of their expectations
and intentions (see Figure 2). The Gulf of Evaluation will differ
depending on the particular interface, context, requirements and
user expectations. For example, a mobile phone interface and
an automatic flight deck will have distinctly different Gulfs of
Evaluation and therefore require different forms of feedback to
be presented to the user.
Typically, when interacting with technology users make an
action and then receive sensory feedback about their action. Con-
sistency between predicted sensory feedback and actual sensory
feedback during action execution has been the focus of several
studies in cognitive neuroscience. Interestingly, empirical evi-
dence indicates that the sense of agency is malleable and feedback
can be distorted to lead participants to misattribute their own
actions as being caused by another agent or visa versa. In cases
where the outcome of an action is incongruent with participants’
predicted sensory outcome, agency can be misattributed to an
external source (Sato and Yasuda, 2005). Conversely Sato and
Yasuda (2005) also induced a false sense of agency for an externally
generated action that matched participants’ predictions. Farrer
et al. (2008) found that deviations in the visual feedback of a
moving curser associated with joystick movement beyond 50◦ led
participants to explicitly attribute their movements to another
agent irrespective of their implicit sensorimotor movements. Sys-
tem feedback presented to the user may also be in the form of
contextual information. Such feedback might have a profound
effect on the user’s experience of agency. For example, Desantis
et al. (2011) demonstrated that prior causal beliefs about the agent
of an action led participants to experience less implicit sense of
agency for self-generated actions that they believed to be caused
by another agent.
In order to achieve optimal control over an interface it will
be beneficial to the interface designer to understand how sensory
feedback of the interface modulates the sense of agency in various
contexts. Evidence regarding the degree to which sensory feedback
should match the user’s predicted feedback is valuable for devel-
oping effective input modalities. This is especially so, considering
the evidence that mismatches between predicted outcome and
actual outcome can actually lead to misattributed sense of agency.
LATENCY
Another factor to note when considering input modalities and the
sense of agency is the latency imposed between the action and
it’s consequent outcome. Latency is commonly presented as an
issue in HCI due to technological constraints within the system.
This can interfere with perceptual constraints such as attention
span or memory load. Therefore another key question in HCI
research is how best to overcome latency in a way that suits the
user’s perceptual capacities. An example would be the Roto and
Oulasvirta (2005) early work on web browsing on a mobile phone.
They identified several temporal constraints, including the speed
of the network connection, the phone’s processing abilities, and
the user’s visual attention span. They found that a user’s attention
typically shifts away from a screen after 4–8 s. At the time of
their research, mobile web browsing suffered from page download
times being over 5 s. Roto and Oulasvirta suggested that a solution
to this is multimodal feedback, with tactile feedback (vibration)
helping to reduce the need for visual attention beyond which is
natural.
In a similar vein to the web-browsing example, neurocognitive
experimental techniques have the potential to validate design
decisions regarding latencies in a range of contexts. Empirical evi-
dence indicates that the intentional binding phenomenon breaks
down beyond 650 ms for a simple button-pressing task (Haggard
et al., 2002). However, there is also evidence for intentional
binding still being intact at 2250 ms for a conflict resolution
task (Berberian et al., 2012). In order to optimally overcome the
effect that latency has on control, an understanding of how the
sense of agency behaves and is modulated over time-scales is
important. In many cases decisions on latency will also involve
trade-offs regarding system feedback and system reliability. For
example, an input classification system can be made more reli-
able by allowing it more time to make an accurate classification
of peoples’ actions, but this will increase the latency of the
system.
BRAIN MACHINE INTERFACES
We conclude this section on input modalities and system feedback
by considering one final input technique that has relevance for
all of the issues we have discussed above. Brain Machine Inter-
faces (BMI) use different aspects of the brain’s cortical activ-
ity such as P300 (Farwell and Donchin, 1988) or slow cortical
potentials (Hinterberger et al., 2004) to control objects such as
prosthetic arms (Velliste et al., 2008), external devices (Wolpaw
and McFarland, 2004) and computer cursers (Kennedy et al.,
2000). BMI suffers from variable reliability largely due to the
fact that it is EEG based and therefore the bandwidths involved
are slow, noisy and suffers variable delays between action and
outcome (Williamson et al., 2009). The field of HCI is currently
attempting to improve control in BMI to make it more effective
in therapeutic contexts. One aspect of this is faster command
execution (Minnery and Fine, 2009). Neurocognitive research
into the sense of agency may offer insights into ways to modify
agency under such latencies. Metrics used to measure the sense of
agency can also provide guidance regarding optimum time delays
a system can take to respond to an action, beyond which agency
starts to break down. BMI has broad feedback channels with
the possibility of providing the user with rich sensory feedback
(Williamson et al., 2009) and thus these feedback channels could
be exploited to provide sensory cues or external contextual cues
which increase the experience of agency despite the latencies
involved.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 643 | 5
Limerick et al. The experience of agency in HCI
COMPUTER ASSISTANCE
Computer systems that assist us in completing tasks are increas-
ingly common and are likely to become ever more common-
place given the increasing capabilities of technology and with the
development of a broader range of intelligent machine interfaces.
The degree to which computers assist us can vary from “high-
assistance”, such as fully automatic flight decks, to “low assis-
tance”, such as the smoothing or snap to point techniques that
are used to make pointing with a mouse on a desktop computer
more accurate. The manner in which the computer “assistant” is
presented can also vary considerably and be made more or less
explicit to the human user. Terveen (1995) identified two broad
forms of computer assistance. The first is human emulation,
where a computer assistant is endowed with human like abilities
and an anthropomorphic representation, which is designed to
ultimately mirror human-human interaction. We consider this
form of assistance in Section Collaboration and Attribution of
Agency below. In the present section we consider Terveen’s sec-
ond category of computer-assisted action. Here the computer
assistance is not presented in an anthropomorphic form and the
assistance is not always made explicit to the user. The aim of such
systems is generally to combine both the human and computer’s
unique abilities to more effectively achieve a particular goal.
Intelligent interfaces and computer-assisted actions are inter-
esting for many reasons, not least because of the varying degrees
of control given to the user and the potential to introduce a grey
area between voluntary and involuntary action. HCI research is
interested in the many interactions now occurring in this grey
area. For example, what happens to a person’s sense of agency
when they voluntarily initiate an action, but a computer then steps
in to complete the action? This agentive ambiguity in interactions
with intelligent technologies also presents interesting challenges
for research into the sense of agency.
TASK AUTOMATION
Many tasks are now automated by computers and machines,
requiring the user to simply monitor the activity and intervene
when required. Some automated tasks are already common in
everyday life, e.g., aircraft control and factory automation. Other
examples, which once seemed like science fiction, are now com-
monplace in research settings and close to becoming an everyday
occurrence, including self-driving cars and robotic surgery. In
developing such systems designers need to think carefully about
the optimal balance between computer assistance and human
sense of agency. This is particularly important in safety critical
systems and in semi-automated systems where a human supervis-
ing the task is held responsible for task failures.
Berberian et al. (2012) investigated the participants’ sense
of agency when performing the complex task of flying a plane
using a flight simulator under different levels of automation.
The task required the participant to observe a flight plan and
after a random time interval, a conflict occurred due to the
presence of another plane. The participant was required to decide
an appropriate command and implement it using a button-
based interface. The action was followed by visual and auditory
feedback informing the user whether they were successful in
their conflict resolution. Participants were asked to estimate the
time interval between the keypress and the auditory feedback.
There were varying levels of automation of the task, from the
user having complete control (no automation) to the computer
executing the entire task with the participant simply observing
(full automation). Berberian et al. found that with increasing
levels of automation the participant’s estimate of action-outcome
time interval duration increased—indicating that more assistance
leads to less implicit sense of agency during the task. The authors
concluded that the intentional binding measure of agency is a
promising metric for HCI research and can assist in the optimal
development of such operator control interfaces.
COMPUTER ASSISTED MOVEMENTS
A vast majority of our interactions with computers require us to
make motor actions. Therefore interface designers have focused
efforts into optimally developing interfaces to compliment the
dynamics of human motor actions. Coyle et al. (2012) investigated
how the sense of agency is effected when a computer assists user’s
mouse movements. Participants undertook a task in which they
were required to point and click on an onscreen target using
a standard mouse. During the experiment the computer gave
participants different levels of targeting assistance in achieving
this task. Once the participant clicked the target, an auditory
tone occurred after a random interval. Implicit sense of agency
was measured during this task by incorporating an interval esti-
mation based intentional binding measure between clicking the
target and hearing the tone. The results indicated that, although
participants were aware of the varying assistance levels, at mild
level of computer assistance they still experienced intentional
binding, suggesting an implicit level of agency occurring for the
action. The intentional binding measure for two further assistance
levels (medium and high assistance) indicated a significant loss of
agency. This suggests that, when interacting with a computer via
assisted mouse movements, there is a point up to which users can
be assisted and still feel a sense of agency, however beyond this
point the experience of agency breaks down, even in situations
where the computer correctly executes the human’s intentions.
Similarly, Kumar and Srinivasan (2013) ran an experiment in
which participants were asked to click targets on a screen, using a
joystick and trigger button. They manipulated the level of control
provided to the user at the sensorimotor level–and measured the
impact control has over implicit (intentional binding) and explicit
(verbal report) sense of agency. The level of control provided to
the joystick movements was varied from low, medium and full
control. Once the trigger button was pressed (action), a blue circle
would appear on the screen (outcome) and participants were
asked to estimate the action-outcome interval. Participants also
verbally reported their sense of authorship for the action. For
tasks where the participants were unsuccessful in hitting the target
and thus not achieving high-level goal, the results are consistent
with that of Coyle et al. (2012) and Berberian et al. (2012)
where intentional binding decreases as a function of automaticity
provided during the task. However, when the goal was achieved,
intentional binding did not show the same pattern.
The investigations above highlight that the sense of agency
may be a graded experience in situations where the line between
voluntary and assisted action is gradually blurred. We suggest that
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metrics for the sense of agency applied in the development of
assisted control tasks would allow the interface designer to address
the point where the experience of agency becomes disrupted. With
regard to the cognitive basis for the sense of agency, the finding
that there is a graded loss of sense of agency with increasing assis-
tance is potentially consistent with our current understanding of
sensorimotor prediction. For example, increasing assistance may
result in internal sensorimotor predictive models becoming less
accurate at predicting the next sensory state; this could therefore
give rise to reduced congruence between the predicted sensory
state and that actual sensory state. Therefore resulting in a reduced
sense of agency for the action, of course, this requires further
investigation.
COLLABORATION AND ATTRIBUTION OF AGENCY
Finally we turn to more explicit forms of computer assistance
and the subject of human emulation. Here a computer agent is
endowed with human like abilities and often an anthropomor-
phic representation that is designed to ultimately mirror human-
human interaction (Terveen, 1995). We explore the relevance of
the perceptual representation of a computer agent and the impact
this has on the sense of agency when collaborating with computer
agents as co-actors to achieve a shared goal. We also consider
the process of attributing agency to a computer agent and how
research into the sense of agency may help inform these areas
within HCI and joint action.
The question of collaboration and attributed agency is also
particularly relevant to the branch of HCI that focuses on
humans’ interaction with robots—Human Robot Interaction
(HRI). Robotics has made significant advances and is progressing
to integrate robot entities into people’s everyday lives (Murphy
et al., 2010). Effective and optimal implementation of human-
robot collaboration techniques rely on HCI research to pro-
vide an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in
representing, understanding and communicating shared inten-
tions between a human and a computer. HRI is faced with the
same challenges in reciprocally representing and communicating
human intentions and the system state of the robot. We believe the
sense of agency and how we attribute it is an important cognitive
consideration for HRI research when assessing how humans relate
to robot co-actors.
The sense of agency is also an important consideration for the
design of embodied virtual agents. Embodied agents are virtual
humans that can engage with people in a human like manner
and aim to both understand and generate speech, gestures and
facial expressions (Cassell, 2000). Cassell states: “they are a type
of software agent insofar as they exist to do the bidding of their
human users, or to represent their human users in a computational
environment”. Such agents have been investigated in application
areas including education (Cassell, 2004; Ogan et al., 2012),
healthcare (Bickmore and Gruber, 2010) and entertainment (Lim
and Reeves, 2010).
The relevance of this section extends to cognitive science
research. A burgeoning area of research on sense of agency inves-
tigates it in social settings (Sebanz et al., 2006; Sebanz, 2007;
Pacherie, 2013). One key area of interest is how social context
modifies the individual’s sense of agency. A number of important
consequences of social context have been identified (Pacherie,
2013). One of these is a quantitative effect: social context can
alter the strength of sense of agency. For example, in a sensori-
motor learning study by van der Wel et al. (2012), they found
little difference in sense of agency between participants acting
along and with another at the beginning of the task. However
as participants became more acquainted with the task significant
differences emerged, with the joint action setting associated with
a weaker sense of agency.
The majority of this work has so far focused on joint action
between human agents. However, joint action between human
and computer agents is now an important consideration both for
agency and HCI research. In the following section we explore this
issue in more detail.
COMPUTERS VS. HUMAN CO-ACTORS
One significant consideration is how our sense of agency for
actions differ when collaborating with computer vs. human part-
ners. A study by Obhi and Hall (2011) addressed this idea by
measuring intentional binding in a joint action task with both
a computer partner and a human partner. The findings suggest
that humans implicitly consider human-human joint actions very
differently to human-computer joint actions. The task involved
a participant acting with either a hidden human or computer
partner making silent key-presses from behind a screen to cause
a tone. Explicit information regarding who was actually respon-
sible for the tone was given. Intentional binding measures were
recorded for the action-outcome interval along with the subject’s
explicit beliefs about who caused the tone. The results showed
that the intentional binding was present when paired with another
human, regardless of whether they explicitly knew they were the
agent or not. This suggests an implicit sense of agency for their co-
actor’s actions and thus indicating a “we-agency” for the action.
For trials with the computer, no intentional binding occurred,
even for trials where participants explicitly knew that they were
the agent. These findings are compelling because they suggest
that implicit agency for self-generated actions are overridden or
inhibited when the participant is aware that a computer is the
co-actor. The authors speculate that the breakdown in implicit
agency here suggests that participants subconsciously develop a
belief that when paired with a computer they have no control over
the task. Furthermore, they suggest that the criteria for forming
“we-agency” are based on comprehending other’s intentions in
a similar way to one’s own, which may be more difficult with
computers.
A similar investigation by Wohlschläger et al. (2003) found
analogous effects. They measured the perceived onset time of
self, other-human and machine generated actions. The results
indicated that the participants had a delayed awareness of action
for the self and other-human conditions. However, participants
had an anticipatory awareness of actions in the machine condi-
tions. In a second experiment Wohlschläger et al. (2003) con-
trolled for the fact that during the machine-action condition
there was a lack of visual information corresponding to the
hand movement seen in the self and other-human conditions.
Therefore, the study was repeated using a rubber hand for the
machine-action trials. This change to the procedure reduced the
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anticipatory effect seen in the first experiment but did not induce
the delayed awareness of action seen for the self and other-human
actions. These findings indicate that intentions are attributed
to others but not to machines. Interestingly, Wohlschläger et
al. suggest that, in the machine action condition, modifying
the sensory feedback in the form of a rubber hand “may have
activated to some extent a system for understanding biological
actions”.
The investigations above suggest that participants implicitly
consider non-biological actions as distinct to self and other
actions. This poses potential challenges in the development of
such agents in order to facilitate optimal collaboration with
humans. One such way to alter this may be the perceptual rep-
resentation of the computer agent. Metrics used to measure the
sense of agency, such as intentional binding offer opportunities to
further test perceptual aspects of computer agents and their affect
on the sense of agency during collaboration.
EMBODIED AGENTS
The perceptual representation of computer co-actors is a crucial
consideration in HCI research. Within HCI there are two theo-
retical positions regarding this, the first holds that the “human-
ness” of the agent is key and that we feel fundamentally less
connected to computer agents compared to other humans and
avatars (Sheehan, 1991). The intentional binding studies outlined
above (Wohlschläger et al., 2003; Obhi and Hall, 2011) feed into
this human centric idea because they indicate that the emergence
of “we-agency” is tightly linked to the nature of the “other” in
joint action tasks. In addition, fMRI studies indicate that the brain
regions activated during a collaborative task are more significantly
activated by human partners compared to computer partners
(Rilling et al., 2004). A contrasting perspective posits that humans
automatically treat computers as social actors (Reeves and Nass,
1996); this is known as the Media Equation. This idea is based on
the observation that humans orient socially to computers in the
same manner as with other humans due to the fact that humans
are “very liberal in assigning humanity to an artificial stimulus as
long as they have at least minimal human features and if they follow
a social rule governing human-to-human interaction” (Lee and
Nass, 2003). The Media Equation goes further and suggests that
designers of computer agents should focus on developing the cues
that elicit the desired perceptions and responses from humans.
There is empirical evidence to support this view. For example, the
emotion conveyed in a computer agent’s tone of voice (happy or
sad) affected the user’s perceived emotion of the content being
conveyed (Nass et al., 2001).
These perspectives differ in the extent of the affect a bio-
logical resemblance of the computer agent has on our ability
to attribute agency to the other. Typically these investigations
explicitly assess attribution of agency through post hoc question-
naires (e.g., Nowak and Biocca, 2003). However, we have seen
that explicit and implicit experiences of agency differ when co-
acting with a computer partner (Obhi and Hall, 2011). Therefore,
using implicit metrics such as intentional binding and sensory
attenuation have the potential to yield important insights in this
area of HCI research. Experimentally, computational techniques
such as virtual reality offer promising new avenues to investigate
the sense of agency in joint action by modifying and controlling
the perceptual and motor requirements of tasks.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This review has highlighted a new area of application for agency
research-HCI. We have focused this review on a selection of
opportunities to investigate the sense of agency in HCI settings;
however this is certainly not intended to be an exhaustive list.
Interaction techniques are evolving at a rapid rate. Once the
validity and benefits of neurocognitive experimental techniques
and implicit metrics such as intentional binding are established
in HCI settings, they have the potential to inform the design of a
wide range of new technologies. They will also provide valuable
insights into how people experience interactions with technol-
ogy and allow designers to more effectively tailor interaction
experiences.
HCI is concerned with developing new or improving exist-
ing interfaces that sit between humans and computers. Thus
this paper proposes that when developing novel interfaces or
improving existing interfaces the user’s experience of agency is an
important consideration. Whilst explicit measures, such as verbal
report are currently utilized in HCI to assess agency, implicit
measures are far less utilized. The relatively small number of prior
studies that crossover between HCI and sense of agency research
have been reviewed here. Of the studies reviewed, intentional
binding has been the primary measure for implicit sense of
agency. Intentional binding has been well replicated for tasks
that require actions and outcomes on a sensorimotor (e.g., sub-
second) timescale. Therefore, it is an ideal measure for assessing
sense of agency in the many HCI tasks that involve agentive
interactions at this timescale. However, we recognize that there
are tasks in HCI that necessarily play out over longer timescales
and for these tasks intentional binding may be less useful. Con-
sider for example a computer game or robotic surgery in which
individual actions combine to achieve a longer-term goal. Both
the immediate experience of agency in individual actions and the
user’s control over the longer-term goal will have an effect on
the user experience. Further investigation will determine whether
alternative measures, both implicit and explicit, may be better
suited to HCI research on these kinds of scenarios.
We have also discussed both implicit and explicit computer
assistance and the impact this has on a user’s sense of agency. For
implicit assistance, research on agency can help to determine the
extent to which users can be assisted whist still maintaining their
experience of agency. For explicit assistance, the questions raised
are different and surround the notion of how a system presents
assistance to the user and how the user will attribute agency
to an explicit computer co-actor. Sense of agency during joint-
action is a current avenue of research, of which HCI techniques
could provide assistance. Techniques such as virtual reality offer
promising new avenues to investigate the sense of agency in joint
action by modifying and controlling the perceptual and motor
requirements of tasks. Within the context of virtual environments
the notion of the virtual self is another interesting area for sense of
agency research. It is commonplace for individuals to take actions
and influence a virtual environment, by proxy, through a virtual
representation of their self.
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Ultimately we believe that HCI researchers can benefit from
an increased understanding of underlying mechanisms involved
in HCI tasks. Understanding these mechanisms will provide an
additional evidence base for the design of interaction systems and
this, in turn, may improve the efficiency of the design process and
maximize the effectiveness of the end product. This understand-
ing may prove particularly important for the growing body of
HCI research focused on developing technology for groups whose
sense of agency may differ from that of the normal population.
This includes systems designed to support people with psychotic
difficulties (Bickmore and Gruber, 2010; Gleeson et al., 2014)
and Parkinson’s disease (Bächlin et al., 2010; Espay et al., 2010;
Mazilu et al., 2014). We also think that HCI can benefit from
new neurocognitive interventions that are being developed. For
example, there is a burgeoning interest in cognitive enhance-
ment through physiological interventions (such as non-invasive
brain stimulation and psychopharmacology). This opens up new
avenues for the HCI community, for example, by offering ways to
artificially modify and improve user experience.
Finally, there is another dimension to investigating the sense
of agency and HCI and that is one of personal responsibility
in an ever-increasing society of technology users and intelligent
machine interfaces. Situations where the distinction between
computer and human controlled actions are blurred during com-
puter assistance or joint action raise important legal and social
questions for the sense of agency and responsibility. This is
particularly so in safety critical scenarios. Consider for example
self-driving cars, which automate the process of driving. One
challenge in HCI is to develop optimal ways in which the interface
can be presented to keep the distal feeling of control intact,
but enable people to leave the proximal sensorimotor control to
the machine. However a balance must also be struck such that
the human “driver” retains a sufficient sense of responsibility to
ensure the safe operation of the car. Understanding how the sense
of agency is modified over time, when interacting with a semi-
automated system, will also be important and may help to guide
the recommended time spent using such interfaces. Within the
HCI literature there are numerous examples of the consequences
of poor interface design in safety critical situations, perhaps the
most infamous of which was recorded in the partial nuclear
meltdown at Three Mile Island. In this case conflicting informa-
tion from a control panel, which operators had come to trust
and rely on, contributed to initial operator inaction and delayed
the response to the escalating crisis (Norman, 1988, pp. 43–44).
Whilst the consequences will rarely be of such significance, the
potential reduction in human responsibility as a consequence of
increased interaction with intelligent interfaces is an important
subject for further investigation. Research on HCI and agency
will play a key role in shaping and informing decisions made
in this area. The initial work of Berberian et al. (2012) showing
operators’ diminished sense of agency in highly automated flight
control scenarios offers a sense of the risk inherent in such
situations.
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